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SUMMARY 
The aim of the paper is to analyse how and in what situations the CJEU applies and interprets 
international law and what margin of appreciation it leaves for national courts when applying 
the Qualification Directive. The main focus is on exploration of the strategies of the Court 
towards Convention and Qualification Directive in asylum cases related to terrorism and 
public security.  
In the first part of the thesis, competences of the CJEU, principle of legal certainty and the 
aim of the preliminary ruling procedure are analysed. There are two judicial roles that the 
Court exercises when it engages with cases related to asylum. One is administrative role that 
promotes uniform application of EU law and the other is constitutional role that enforces 
fundamental rights and general principles of EU law. The legally complex situation between 
Qualification Directive, Convention, TFEU and the Charter has set the Court in a position 
where its effectiveness is questionable and passive.  
The second part of the research focuses on interactions between EU, international and 
national law to better understand the Court’s position and how it could possibly better provide 
guidance by seeing all international actors at once. First, the hierarchy of EU legal order and 
the status of EU itself are examined where EU within legal personality can still be bound by 
customary international law. Second, as Qualification Directive is a part of common asylum 
policy, it is a shared competence between EU and Member States. Moreover, it embeds 
explicit references to the Convention. As Member States are left with a certain margin of 
appreciation in the asylum field it is relevant to overview the solidarity principle where states 
rather choose to disclose into different political and economic goals. Third, the position of the 
Convention depends on CJEU’s monist and dualist approaches towards international law that 
is analysed in a case-law that contributes to the research analogically. 
The third part of the thesis analysis case-law related to asylum, terrorism and public security. 
The rulings of CJEU crystallizes approaches towards international and national law. The 
Court’s overall approach manifests into principle of proportionality where the Court engages 
with the international law as far as it concerns uniform application of EU law, but the 
individual assessment and interpretation of the facts of the case leaves for the national 
authorities. The margin of appreciation left for states rather engages with application of 
human rights and responsibility towards international commitments. 
The research has shown that the CJEU is put in a difficult position to stand up as an 
administrative and constitutional court and there is a need to amend TFEU and the 
Qualification Directive to overcome the existing collision between EU law and the 
Convention. CJEU is the final judicial body that can provide guidance about uniform 
application of EU law, but if it is set in a complex context where rather ambiguously 
formulated treaty provisions interact with the Charter and the Convention then it comes as no 
surprise that it stays passive and reluctant towards international law.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The on-going migration crisis from the Middle East has set the European Union (EU) and the 
EU law in ever unexpected pressure internally between Member States and externally 
between EU and international arena. Currently, EU is one of the major actors in anti-terrorism 
and asylum law and they interact in the Qualification Directive, the Convention, the Charter 
and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
1
 The core legal instrument that 
protects the rights related to the status of refugee is the Convention.
2
 It is also the yardstick of 
EU asylum policy where TFEU, the Charter and the Qualification Directive embed explicit 
references to the Convention. While the Charter, TFEU declare fundamental right to asylum, 
the Qualification Directive restricts the criteria for the applicant. For example, if the asylum 
seeker applies for a refugee status and has previously supported local group of armed militia, 
all aforementioned legal instruments apply. The problem question arises about the provision 
of the Qualification Directive that restricts the right even more than the same provision in the 
Convention and might be considered as a breach of international law. In other words, the 
Qualification Directive bears broader exclusion criterion when there is reasonable danger to 
the security of the Member State. Obviously, one could not simply be a refugee and a 
terrorist, but what can be regarded as reasonable danger also is unclear and leaves the 
authority with broad interpretation.  
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is the judicial authority that shall provide a clear answer 
when the Qualification Directive is challenged. However, there is a lack of enforcement 
because also the CJEU is very reluctant to apply international law and it can be observed that 
the Court has developed certain strategies concerning common asylum policy. Nevertheless, 
the CJEU is put in a very complex position in where rather ambiguously formulated Treaty 
provisions interact with the Charter (right to asylum) and international human rights 
standards. Moreover, it is asked to act almost like an international refugee court which it is 
not.
3
 For example, in Qurbani case, the CJEU was asked to interpret Article directly from the 
Convention.
4
  
                                                     
1
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted, OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, pp. 9–26. Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0095. Accessed May 11, 2018. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391–407. Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. Accessed May 11, 2018. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). 1951 Convention and Relating to the Status of Refugees. Available on: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf. Accessed March 5, 2018. Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. Accessed May 5, 2018.  
2
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1951 Convention and Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Introductory note by the Office of the UNHCR, p.2. Available on: 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf. Accessed March 5, 2018. Moritz Baumgärtel, “Part of the Game,” in The 
Changing Practices of International Law, ed. Tanja Aalberts, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 103–28. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p.104. 
3
 Geert De Baere, “The Court of Justice of the EU as a European and International Asylum Court,” Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No.118-August 2013, p.1, Available at: 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/414528/1/wp118-de-baere.pdf. Accessed May 10, 2018. 
4
 See judgement in Qurbani, C‑481/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101, paragraph 16.  
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Common European Asylum system (CEAS) was developed to ensure uniform rights for 
asylum seekers within the EU.
5
 Nevertheless, CEAS is a shared competence and dilemma 
because the Convention is not signed by the EU, but by Member States. Therefore, the tension 
is also noticeable internally where the sovereignty overtops the principle of solidarity and 
number of Member States have opted-out from adaption of the Qualification Directive. Even 
thought, a shared competence divides responsibility between Member States and the Union, 
EU by embracing its legal personality is still bound by customary international law.
6
 
Therefore, in a case of a breach, EU must face consequences and international responsibility.  
The research question is how and in what situations the CJEU applies and interprets 
international law and what margin of appreciation it leaves for Member States when applying 
Qualification Directive. The initial hypothesis is that the final decision when applying the 
Qualification Directive is balanced between the CJEU and national authorities. Additionally, 
the CJEU has developed certain strategies to bypass international law in order not to 
undermine the overall legal certainty of the EU system.
7
 Therefore, the role and the 
competences of the Court are very decisive elements that will be analysed. 
Methodology 
The research engages with primary and secondary sources from the angle that is the role of 
CJEU. The following study is mainly based on case-law analysis where the main focus is on 
exploration of the strategies of the Court towards Convention and Qualification Directive. 
The study also includes analysis of CJEU’s competences, its dualist and monist approaches, 
and interactions between EU, international and national law. Moreover, the thesis engages 
with analysis of case-law that contributes to the research analogically to better comprehend 
approaches of CJEU with EU and international law.  
The main source of information is case-law and works of scholars Ziegler, Lenaerts, Bank and 
Peers as they have contributed the most to the research of interaction between EU and 
international level concerning Qualification Directive and CJEU. The principles of customary 
international law and legal certainty will be also analysed where an attitude of minimal 
guidance could be seen as Court’s reluctance towards international law or rather exceptional 
approach that cannot be regarded as its main practice.  
Scope 
The study is focused on Qualification Directive and Convention in asylum cases related to 
terrorism and public security. The aspects how the CJEU interprets or engages with 
international law and how much discretion it leaves for Member States will be analysed also 
beyond the Qualification Directive and Convention. Mainly the Court’s struggle between its 
administrative and constitutional role in the general institutional framework within the context 
of asylum will be analysed. Considering the margin of appreciation left for Member States it 
is relevant to overview the solidarity principle that will be addressed in the context of asylum. 
Terms as roles, trends and approaches are synonyms. 
                                                     
5
 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 13-15. Available on: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. Accessed May 10, 2018. 
6
 Katja Ziegler, “Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU law, Human Rights and 
International Law,” in Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights, ed. by Sionaidh Douglas-Scott et al. 
(Elgar, 2017), pp. 274-276. 
7
 Boštjan Zalar, “Comments on the Court of Justice of the EU’s Developing Case Law on Asylum.” 
International Journal of Refugee Law 25(2):  p.1.  
 7 
Structure 
The following research consists of three parts. It starts with examination of the competences 
of CJEU, overview of case-law related to Qualification Directive. The second part analysis 
interactions between EU and international law as well as EU and national law including 
examination of EU itself and principle of solidarity. The second part complements the 
following analysis of case-law (facts) in the third part. The final part examines rulings of 
CJEU and possible approaches the Court has towards international and national law. 
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1. LEGAL SETTING OF CJEU 
After the Lisbon Treaty the CJEU was granted full jurisdiction in the field of asylum.
8
 It 
means that after this amendment if it was not clear how to apply EU law, national bodies were 
on their way to ask for preliminary ruling question because the CJEU had jurisdiction. One of 
the reasons of preliminary reference procedure is to ensure that there is uniformity of EU 
provision or concept when it is applied.
9
 Additionally, as commented by Zalar, the Court has 
to provide legal certainty, exercise effective judicial administration and facilitate deeper 
integration of EU law in all judiciary levels in case law of asylum.
10
 However, it can be 
argued that, the Court’s position in the EU institutional framework within asylum context not 
always ensures clarity about proper application of EU law, especially in application of the 
common asylum policy.  
In 2015 Europe experienced a high number influx of asylum seekers.
11
 It could be as a 
consequence due to the geographical location, however, there is a number of asylum seekers 
that use the situation as economic migrants
12
. In the EU, where all Member States share the 
same fundamental values and borders, CEAS was adopted to provide a uniform integration of 
third country nationals and to guarantee rights to refugees. Even more, Convention was 
established as the yardstick of the common asylum policy and therefore have to be treat like a 
basic norm of it.
13
 This migration crisis is a topical issue because the fundamental values of 
EU are challenged and brought before the CJEU.
14
 Moreover, there is a perception that CJEU 
should act as an international refugee court which is not actually its competence.
15
 Even 
though, it has interpreted and applied the Convention, it acts within certain limits.  
Nevertheless, Article 267(b) TFEU sets out that the CJEU has the mandate to examine the 
validity of secondary EU law (Qualification Directive) that explicitly refers to international 
law (Convention), it is stated in the Article 263 TFEU that the Court can interpret acts that are 
in its jurisdiction - acts of institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.
16
 Therefore, it 
means that the Court has a jurisdiction to interpret only EU law not international law which 
means that it cannot review the Convention itself even though it is a central core of the EU 
asylum policy.
17
 
                                                     
8
 Christian Kaunert and Sarah Leonard, “The European Union Asylum Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon,” 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 31(4) (2012), pp.1, 16.  
9
 Thomas de la Mare and Catherine Donnelly, “Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration,” in The evolution 
of EU law, ed. Paul Craig and Grainne De Bâurca p.379. 
10
 Supra 7, p.377. 
11
 In 2015 there were 1 322 800 applications in total. “Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member 
States, 2006–2017,” source: Eurostat. Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics. Accessed May 15, 2018.  
12
 Isaac Kfir, “Refugeeship and Natural Law: The European Court of Human Rights,” Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights, Vol. 33/4 (2015): p.138.  
13
 Supra 5, paragraph 13.  
14
 Silja Klepp, “A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border 
Control in the Mediterranean Sea,” European Journal of Migration and Law 12 (2010): pp.19-20.  
15
 Supra 3, p.1. 
16
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 
Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. Accessed May 5, 2018. 
17
 Roland Bank, “The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Shaping 
International Refugee Law,” International Journal of Refugee Law 27/2 (2015): p.221. 
 9 
Article 6(3) TEU sets out general principles of the EU law where one of them are respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law.
18
 It means that the CJEU must place 
international law within the EU legal arrangement when deciding on effectiveness of 
international law.
19
 However, even though the Court still can apply international law instead 
of EU law, the recent case law show that its approach has changed to be more dualistic to 
apply EU law instead of international law that brings up to overthink limitations of the 
Court’s mandate. It can be observed, that the Court recognizes the fundamental rights for 
asylum seeker, but stays reluctant to refer or apply the Convention.
20
 One of the reasons that 
could explain Court’s attitude is that it strives to secure the effectiveness of EU law. Yet, 
rulings are partly ambiguous and leave broader room for interpretation to national courts. For 
example, discretion left for national bodies is reasoned in B and D, Lounani and H.T cases.
21
 
Furthermore, there is a duty of sincere cooperation and the principle of judicial protection 
between all judicial authorities in Member States to make a deeper integration of EU law.
22
 It 
means that in order to ensure uniform application and further integration of valid EU law, the 
CJEU is the final body that can provide guidance or examine the validity of the contested EU 
norm. Furthermore, common asylum policy is a combination of national law, EU law, 
European Convention of Human rights (ECHR), international law and other treaties meaning 
that Member States implement EU directive, they are bound by ECHR, Convention and the 
Charter.
23
 Hence, for example, if the national body is not sure whether provision of 
Qualification Directive is valid (that includes broader exclusion criteria than the Convention), 
in order to ensure a uniform and correct application of EU legal instrument, national court 
must refer to CJEU. However, meanwhile the Court struggles to secure the effectiveness and 
uniform and correct application of secondary EU law, there is a tension arising due to 
protection of individual fundamental rights that influence the application. Therefore, the 
CJEU has become in a very complex position to balance between its administrative and 
constitutional role.
24
  
In the last years cases like B and D, Lounani have challenged the Court’s judicial role 
concerning asylum policy to deal with issues that have put it in different types of discourses. 
From the point of preliminary reference procedure, two different functions of the CJEU in the 
context of asylum related matters can be observed.
25
 First, the CJEU exercises a function of 
an administrative court when it promotes a uniform and effective application of secondary EU 
law and provides a guidance for national courts.
26
 Although, the Court is not providing the 
                                                     
18
 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326/13, 26.10.2012. Available on: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
Accessed May 16, 2018. 
19
 Christina Eckes, “International Law as Law of the EU: The Role of The Court of Justice,” Centre for the Law 
of the EU External Relations 6 (2010): p.5. 
20
 See judgements in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D, joined cases C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:661, judgement in Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides v Mostafa Lounani, C-
573/14, EU:C:2017:71 and judgement in H. T. v Land Baden-Württemberg, C‑373/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:413. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Supra 9, p.376. 
23
 Supra 1. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed 16 May 2018. 
24
 Supra 17, p.240. 
25
 See judgements in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D, joined cases C‑57/09 and C‑101/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:661, judgement in Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides v Mostafa Lounani, C-
573/14, EU:C:2017:71. 
26
 Supra 17, p.240. 
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final ruling in particular case, its decision on the interpretation of EU law contributes to the 
national court’s final ruling.27  
Second, there are fundamental values that are located within the EU legislation and enforced 
by the Court. The fundamental human rights and general principles are the core strengths of 
EU law.
28
 Accordingly, the enforcement of fundamental rights by the Court is an exercise of a 
constitutional court because those rights are from higher legal force.
29
 Therefore, the Court 
has to overcome a very complicated situation when the EU law coincides with fundamental 
human rights. Even more, the Court’s authority is challenged when Member States 
themselves cannot find a balance and their national constitutional values are faced.
30
  
Moreover, from a different perspective, there could be also a tension between fundamental 
rights of the EU sovereign and fundamental rights of the individual (asylum seeker who has 
criminal background) from the third country. In more detail, the idea is whether the rights of 
the sovereign from the EU are not infringed when the rights of the individual are enforced in 
the national court or CJEU. Article 3(1) TFEU sets out that one of the goals of EU is the well-
being of its citizens. Moreover, Article 3(2) TFEU adds that the Union shall offer its citizens 
secure environment. And even more, Article 2 TFEU emphasizes that the EU is found on 
values that honour democracy. Therefore, it could be argued that the fundamental right to live 
in secure area of the sovereign of EU is infringed by elaborating that - the sovereign is the 
very basic of a democratic rule of law based state that is a part of EU.
31
 The sovereign shall 
have the priority right (as his home) to live in a secured country if he feels that his rights are 
infringed by third country nationals that have criminal background.  
Notwithstanding that the preliminary reference procedure has various functions the main goal 
of the procedure is to rise clarity in Member States about EU law. However, it is crucial how 
the national courts present questions before the Court.
32
 For example, even though, the 
question referred is about validity of EU law, the core essence of the question might be about 
issue where the Court does not even have a mandate to answer.
33
 As a consequence, the 
national court is left in a confused situation and that might be translated as the Court’s 
passivism as it can be observed in Qurbani case where it was asked to interpret provision 
from the Convention, but the preliminary question did not contain any reference to provision 
from the Qualifications Directive. CJEU even deviated from the mere fact that the preamble 
of the Qualifications Directive include references to the Convention which means that it 
corresponds to the whole legal act.
34
  
If the legal instruments of EU are questioned and the Court does not raise clarity about how to 
interpret them, that raises a question of how effective the judicial protection in EU legal order 
is at all. From one side the Court has a mandate to examine EU law, but it does not mean that 
                                                     
27
 Supra 9, p.368. 
28
 Supra 9, p 379. 
29
 Supra 17, p.240. 
30
 Loic Azoulai and Zane Rasnaca, “The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Self-Made Statesman,” in 
A Companion to European Union Law and International Law, ed. Dennis Patterson et al. (Willey: Blackwell, 
2016), p.173. 
31
 Supra 16.  
32
 Supra 9, p.368. 
33
 Supra 4. 
34
 Supra 4, paragraph 27. Recitals 3, 4, 23 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, pp. 9–26. Available on: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0095. Accessed May 11, 2018. 
 11 
the Court has a competence to examine its compatibility with international law and declare it 
void. In that case it could mean that CJEU would be asked to interpret international law, 
which is definitely not its competence. From the other side even if the secondary EU law has 
been challenged, the Court is not very active on using its mandate even to make it void 
without interpretation of international law. However, on the contrary, it might be that the 
Court tries to find a solution how to not infringe fundamental rights but at the same time 
supports secondary EU law because the case law of CJEU constitutes a cornerstone of 
compliance.
35
 Additionally, the Court’s attitude might be explained because of ambiguously 
constructed Treaties meaning that provisions included are indefinite, they are of broad logic 
and it is not simply possible to review the legality of EU law within international law.
36
 
Overall, when providing rulings, the Court has to see the whole EU system together not only 
one provision from EU law.  
1.1. Overview of CJEU case law 
There is noticeable number of cases that have been submitted before the Court and it has 
become more involved in matters related to migrant rights. The success and expansion of the 
Court’s competences in last decades today have been strategically challenged by non-
governmental organisations and lawyers who specialize in asylum field.
37
 Not only the 
importance of fundamental rights and values have been triggered, but also the institutional 
position of the Court itself which is in the very centre when there is any disagreement about 
migration policy.
38
 The most significant legal interventions are about, for example, the scope 
of the principle of non-refoulment, decisions about subsidiary protection and different 
grounds for exclusion.
39
 
Most actively EU Asylum policy regarding Qualification Directive is questioned by Germany 
(fourteen cases) and Netherlands (seven cases). Less references are from Ireland, Belgium, 
Sweden and even less – from Austria and Hungary, United Kingdom. The most referred 
question is about the scope of the principle of non-refoulment, also whether the applicant is 
entitled to subsidiary protection. Meaning, that in a case of his return there is possibility that 
                                                     
35
 Supra 9, p.376. 
36
 Judgement in International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), International Association 
of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register, 
International Salvage Union v Secretary of State for Transport, C-308/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, paragraph 50.  
37
 Moritz Baumgärtel, “Part of the Game,” in The Changing Practices of International Law, ed. Tanja Aalberts, 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 103–28. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p.106. 
38
 Ibid, p.104. 
39
 In total there are thirty-three cases related to Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC (Recast 2011/95/EC) with 
judgements and preliminary ruling references before the CJEU. A raise in caseload started after year 2011 when 
national lower instance courts were enabled to refer preliminary ruling questions due to the amendments of 
Lisbon Treaty. Currently, there are 22 judgements and 11 pending preliminary references. Moreover, a number 
of cases are in a close connection with Dublin Regulation because it determines the country responsible for 
examining the application for asylum seeker and is equivalent legal remedy to the Qualification Directive. 
Other most litigated topics are about cessation of the protection, revocation of refugee status, procedural 
questions and grounds for exclusion. The qualification standards could not amount if there is already provided 
protection from the agency (for example, from United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East) or the asylum seeker cannot be granted the refugee status because of criminal acts exercised in 
the past, including terrorism related activities. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles and European 
Legal Network on Asylum. List of Relevant Asylum Judgements and Pending Preliminary References from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. January 2018, pp.22-42. Available on: 
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/Recent%20Asylum%20Judgm
ents%20and%20Pending%20Preliminary%20References%20before%20the%20CJEU%20-
%20January%202018.pdf. Accessed April 1, 2018. 
 12 
he will suffer a serious harm, he runs a genuine risk of, inter alia, being prosecuted or he is 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in the country of origin. 
Reference questions are mostly based on sexual orientation, health issues and freedom of 
religion. Moreover, the references are accompanied with questions about proper interpretation 
of articles from the Charter.
40
  
By the timeline of cases it can be observed, that the states strategically try to challenge the 
CJEU by referring questions that make the Qualification Directive seem to look vague. The 
very last preliminary references are whether the Qualification Directive where new exclusion 
criteria could be introduced is compatible with the Convention.
41
 The most relevant cases 
about exclusion depending on serious threat to public security and terrorism will be discussed 
in the third part.  
                                                     
40
 Ibid. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391–407. Available on: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. Accessed May 11 2018. 
41
 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 14 July 2016, M 
v Ministerstvo vnitra, OJ C 350, 26.9.2016, p. 16–16, C-391/16. Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CN0391. Accessed 15 May 2018. Request for a preliminary ruling from 
the Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers (Belgium) lodged on 13 February 2017 — X v Commissaire général 
aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, OJ C 144, 8.5.2017, p. 28–29, Case C-77/17. Available on: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62017CN0077. Accessed 15 May 2018. 
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2. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEGAL ORDERS 
One of the main legal instruments on the common asylum policy is the Qualifications 
Directive. In the preamble of this directive it is established that the Convention is a 
cornerstone of the CEAS.
42
 Moreover, all Member States are signatories to the Convention, 
but EU itself has not signed it.
43
 It means that the Convention is binding on Member States, 
but not on the Union following that the responsibility in asylum field can be seen as shared 
and also the final decision about granting the refugee status when applying Qualifications 
Directive is balanced between CJEU and national authorities.
44
 
However, even though the EU has not taken over obligations, the very binding heart of the 
Convention is also established, firstly, in the TFEU and, secondly, in the Charter.
45
 One could 
argue that the Convention reflects base values of the Union and thereby was established 
within primary EU law. Consequently, the CJEU is put in a difficult position where rather 
vaguely constructed Treaty regulations interact with the Charter and Convention.  
To better understand position of the Convention within the realm of EU law, different roles 
exercised by CJEU and margin of appreciation left for national authorities - interplays 
between EU, international and national legal orders have to be analysed. The following 
subsection will start with analysing hierarchy of international law within EU legal order and 
case-law that contributes to the research analogically.  
2.1. Interaction between EU and international law 
When it comes to the hierarchy of EU legal order, the meaning of what is the EU itself comes 
to the fore. Jan Klabbers has argued that EU is a unique international organisation of common 
good and cannot be treated in the same way as other organisations like, for example, World 
Health Organisation. Indeed, the organisation has been established by states, it has been set up 
by the Treaty and it has its own institutional organs. Subsequently, the concept of an 
international organisation is broad enough to shape it according to the situation.
46
 With this in 
mind, the Union benefits of this notion of an international organisation in areas where the 
legal position, political attitude is not defined completely, meaning that the Union can form it 
according to the circumstances. 
Moreover, EU has become largely constitutionalized and combines elements from an 
international organisation and a state.
47
 It should therefore come as no surprise that, even 
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Alexandra Popescu, “The EU Costs of the Refugee Crisis,” Europolity, 10 (2016), p.118. 
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 Katja S. Ziegler, “The Relationship between EU law and International Law”, in A Companion to European 
Union Law and International Law, ed. Dennis Patterson et al. (Willey: Blackwell, 2016), p.40.   
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though the EU is an important actor and influencer of international law, it holds sole 
uniqueness that can manifest into approaches of dual perspective. From one side, EU is held 
accountable and evaluated due to its legal personality as an international actor.
48
 Form the 
other side, as it holds its individual framework that could be hardly comparable to any other 
international organisation or pre-conditions for international organisation
49
, it retains a choice 
of dualist or monist approaches towards international law. 
Nevertheless, the Article 3(5) TEU sets out general compliance towards international law that 
“[t]he Union shall contribute to […] the strict observance and the development of 
international law,” therefore granting the aforementioned duty to comply with international 
obligations.
50
 The natural embeddedness of international law within realm of EU law set in 
Article 3(5) TEU has been also recognised by CJEU in cases when referring to international 
law as an essential part of EU law.
51
 However, the argument here does not prove that the 
international law being a part of EU law make it crystal-clear what is the status of 
international law within EU legal order and whether does it have to be applied in the same 
way as EU law.
52
 It is important because if the international law is directly effective in EU 
legal framework, it shall prevail over national law in Member States because under Article 47 
TEU states have transferred their sovereignty to the Union.
53
 In spite of the theory, it is 
necessary to analyse how CJEU in practice has defined the relationship between EU and 
international law, therefore case-law that analogically contributes to the research will be 
analysed.  
2.1.1. CJEU’s approaches towards international law 
A recent judgement in Kadi I case is one of the examples how the CJEU instead of applying 
international law directly, reviews the EU regulation within the primary EU law.
54
 Moreover, 
this case is an example how the rights of an individual (who was considered person who 
contributes to terrorism) interact with EU regulation to counter terrorism by transposing the 
resolution of United Nations (UN).
55
 The reasoning shows that the CJEU chose to approach 
this matter from more constitutional/dualist perspective that can be considered one of the 
approaches of the Court how it deals with international law when EU primary law is 
challenged. There are similarities to the research object where the Qualification Directive, 
TFEU and Charter bear references to the Convention and how the attitude of the CJEU could 
be predicted in cases in the context of asylum, terrorism and security.  
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Similarly, as discussed above about the binding nature of the Convention and matter of 
Qualification Directive - EU is not bound by the UN Charter, but Member States are which 
was one of the reasons the CJEU excluded the direct effect following from the international 
obligation.
56
 Subsequently, CJEU ruled on fundamental principles of EU law without even 
reviewing the normative. It simply declared that there cannot be any derogation from 
constitutional principles of EU law as principle of judicial protection (right to be heard). 
However, the reasoning of Kadi I case has left doubts whether EU is even bound by the UN 
Charter as the CJEU has showed its autonomy towards international obligations being the 
final judicial body that enforces EU law.
57
 Therefore, it raises doubts whether the Court could 
take similar approach concerning the Convention and Qualification Directive. In other words, 
would the Court dare to avoid the Convention and review the validity of the Qualification 
Directive from the perspective of TFEU and the Charter even if all aforementioned EU law 
sources refer to the Convention.  
Even more, the Article 103 of the UN Charter clearly states that parties shall give prevalence 
to the UN Charter.
58
 Therefore, aforementioned reasons could be considered as basis for 
exclusion for any other international obligations from international law.
59
 Thus, the interplay 
between international and EU law has already proved to engage in more of dualist approach, 
but in the same time the CJEU has demonstrated that it strives to achieve balance between all 
international actors.
60
 Again, specific rulings that do not provide full effect to international 
law cannot be automatically considered that now this kind of practice will follow in all other 
similar cases and that the CJEU has changed its approach.
61
 
Furthermore, from the perspective of general principles of law, for example, the general 
principle of legal certainty, CJEU has declared that the secondary international law has to be 
interpreted “as far as possible” in the light of international law.62 Thus, international treaties 
where the EU is a signatory require a consistent interpretation of secondary EU law which 
means that in the EU legal hierarchy international law is above secondary EU law and below 
primary EU law.
63
 Subsequently, it shall also allow the CJEU to review the legality of 
secondary EU law taking into account the binding character of the international law, with a 
condition if the EU is a signatory to it.
64
 Moreover, a ‘substantive borrowing’ may be used 
where no formal relationship has been developed. In other words, the effect to international 
treaty may be given in a way that it serves as gap filler in EU law.
65
 Still, ambiguous rulings 
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where the CJEU provides minimal guidance do not clearly state the position of international 
law in the hierarchy of EU law and might cause unnecessary case load before the Court.
66
 
However, even though the EU is not a party to any of aforementioned international 
agreements, one could argue that EU is bound by customary international law. Article 47 
TEU sets out that “[t]he Union shall have legal personality,” where it is evident that if 
combined with the status of international organisation, it means that EU has international 
legal personality.
67
 The consequence is that even if the EU is not bound by international 
agreement, it still contributes to the development of international and customary law by 
deriving international responsibility as one of the actors of international arena.
68
 For example, 
if EU will further exercise strong dualist approach towards international obligations, other 
third countries also might follow that could make international treaties less important.  
Again, although the CJEU has acknowledged the principle of direct effect of customary 
international law for the validity to review EU secondary law, the criteria have been narrowed 
down.
69 
In AATA case, the CJEU stated that its mandate is limited to review whether EU 
legislative bodies have made obvious mistakes when assessing the application of the 
principles of customary international law because those principles are not as precise as 
provisions from international treaty.
70
 Moreover, in addition the CJEU also restricted criteria 
of the possibility to relay on customary international law for individual’s right.71 In other 
words, the condition, that the norm had to be clear sufficiently was not enough. So, the 
respective provision had to confer to individual’s right to have a direct effect. It means that 
the later condition has decreased individuals chance to invoke application of the direct effect 
which is actually contrary to protected individual’s interests to invoke international law (right 
to asylum).
72
  
This aspect raises doubt about CJEU’s attitude towards principle of customary international 
law from the perspective of the right to asylum and what shall be regarded as ‘particularly 
serious crime’ under exclusion criteria in the Convention. As what shall be regarded as 
‘particularly serious crime’ has not been clearly defined in the Convention and there is no 
conferral towards states that the individual has to be granted asylum, one could guess that the 
CJEU would choose not to relay on the Convention even as taking it into account from the 
perspective of principle of customary international law.  
Another example is CJEU’s approach in Intertanko case where it clearly stated conditions that 
have to be met for a direct application of international treaty. First, EU has to be bound by the 
treaty provision. Second, the rule has to be clear enough, precise and unconditional. Third, 
direct effect is not precluded by the ‘nature and structure’ or ‘broad logic’ of a treaty.73 
However, the EU had not ratified the international treaty and CJEU ruled that provisions of 
the treaty do not confer individual right to have a direct effect as it was considered more state-
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centred in nature. Moreover, the CJEU pointed out that even though the secondary EU law 
has the objective to embody certain provisions from the international treaty, it is not sufficient 
and binding for the CJEU to review the legality of secondary EU law against international 
law.
74
 Obviously, the CJEU already in this case has declared what are the criteria to examine, 
for example, Qualification Directive in the light of the Convention. However, all three criteria 
would not be fulfilled because EU is not bound by the Convention.  
From one side, it raises doubts whether direct effect of customary international law within EU 
legal framework would be even possible as the Court acts like a gate opener.
75
 It seems, that 
the CJEU is not going to review Qualification Directive in the light of the Convention even 
from the perspective of the principle of customary international law. From the other side, 
indeed, the direct application is not possible if the norms in international treaty are vaguely 
constructed and the EU is not a signatory to the international treaty. However, ambiguous 
provisions of EU law might be still valid due to the context and purpose
76
 and might mean 
that the Court’s reluctance towards international law depends on specifics of the case. 
Consequently, CJEU’s role is set in a difficult context to deal with rather ambiguously 
formulated treaty provisions that interact with the Charter and human rights. Even more, it 
might be concluded that examination of EU law includes balancing and comprehensive 
approach to cover all levels of legal orders with what the EU law could interact and it seems 
one of the tasks of CJEU.  
2.2. TFEU and the Charter 
This subsection discusses explicit references to the Convention that are embedded in TFEU 
and the Charter. As the TFEU and the Charter are sources of primary EU law it is off utter 
importance to understand whether they provide direct effect to the individual and therefore, 
whether CJEU would have the mandate to examine the validity of the Qualification Directive 
with the Convention.
77
  
The Article 18 of the Charter sets out that  
“[r]ight to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect to […] Geneva Convention 
[…] and in accordance with the TEU and TFEU,”  
where it is not actually clear whether the individual has the right to be granted asylum or the 
Member States have the right to grant asylum. However, taking into account the general 
essence of the Charter, beneficiary of the right to asylum shall be every individual whose 
rights have been protected by international agreement as, for instance, the Convention.
78
 
On the other hand, although, the Article 18 of the Charter introduces a direct right to asylum 
for an individual, it could be argued whether it also confers upon the right or freedom to 
individual of being capable to relay on Member States.
79
 Indeed, when the asylum seeker 
enters the territory of EU, the EU law applies. It should, even so, be stressed that the asylum 
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seeker has the right to asylum, but with no means that provision has to be interpreted as the 
Member State is obliged to grant the refugee status in its territory. Therefore, migrants whose 
asylum application is inadmissible, are sent to Turkey that has voluntarily agreed with EU to 
take migrants.
80
 That is to say, the principle of non-refoulment is not violated as the asylum 
seeker is not sent back to a territory where his life and freedom would be in danger.  
Furthermore, Article 78(1) TFEU acknowledges that the ECAS shall be compatible with the 
Convention as  
“The Union shall develop a common policy in asylum […] offering status to any third 
country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulment. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention […] and other relevant treaties,”  
therefore acknowledging the Convention as the yardstick of the asylum policy.
81
 Thus, from a 
general view, the explicit references to the Convention in both aforementioned articles of the 
Charter and TFEU would mean double breach of primary EU law if interpreted inconsistent 
with it.
82
 Moreover, in case NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the CJEU itself 
pointed out that Member States when interpreting provisions form national law, they must 
interpret them consistent with EU law and not relay on an interpretation of an secondary 
legislation that would be in conflict with fundamental rights protected within the realm of EU 
law or general principles of EU law.
83
 Consequently, again, this statement strikingly presents 
that even though Member States have to implement Qualification Directive that includes 
broader exclusion criteria, they are responsible themselves whether to comply with the 
exclusion criteria set in the Convention which is embedded in primary EU law. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the prerequisite mentioned in Article 78(1) TFEU that the 
CEAS shall be in conformity with the Convention also empowers the CJEU to examine the 
compatibility of the Qualification Directive with the Convention.
84
 Therefore, while it 
remains a major misunderstanding about the EU legal framework’s hierarchical system and 
unclear wording in treaty articles, that leaves, firstly, Member States in a very uncomfortable 
situation and, secondly – the authority of CJEU has been put at risk as it shall appear as safe, 
final judicial institution that provides guidance and raises clarity for national courts.  
2.3. Qualifications Directive and the Convention  
The CJEU has never been asked to interpret or examine Article 14(5) from the Qualification 
Directive that is the problem issue in the research, but currently there are corresponding cases 
pending before the court.
85
 While the reasoning by CJEU of the aforementioned collision is 
still in the process, the purpose, recast process of the Qualification Directive and the main 
problem issue between it and the Convention has to be analysed to understand the background 
of the EU legal instrument.  
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In 1999 at the Tampare European Council the Union set a goal to establish a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) with a full inclusion of the Geneva Convention and 
ensuring that it will maintain the principle of non-refoulement.
86
 In order to ensure uniform 
interpretation of asylum rights and respect to asylum seekers across the Member States, 
European Council issued number of directives. One of the component established within 
CEAS was the Qualification Directive on the qualification standards for and content of 
refugee and international protection.
87
 However, the directive was highly criticised and 
therefore the European Commission submitted a recast proposal by ensuring even higher 
protection on the basis of full application of the Convention as well as for ECHR, the Charter 
and related developing case-law.
88
 
Overall, the main elements amended were about clarification of legal concepts like “actors of 
protection", "internal protection" and "membership of a particular social group” as well as 
clarification of the right to subsidiary protection, duration of residence permit, but nothing 
amended about clarifying exclusion criteria which is one of the elements of this paper’s 
research question.
89
 After all, one could conclude that the legislator’s intent was to ensure that 
the asylum policy is in accordance with the Convention and therefore, also has to be 
interpreted in the light with it.  
Nevertheless, the main problem can be found between Article 12(2) and Article 14(4) and (5) 
of the Qualifications Directive and Article 33(2) and Article 1F of the Convention.
90
Article 
12(2) of the Qualifications Directive sets out exclusion criteria from Article 1F of the 
Convention when a third-country national or stateless person is excluded from being a 
refugee. However, inconsistency of provisions appears in Article 14(4) and (5) of the 
Directive and Article 33(2) of the Convention where the provisions from the Qualification 
Directive introduce broader exclusion criteria than the Convention.  
According to the Convention, the asylum seeker becomes a refugee when he has been granted 
the status and the asylum seeker can be excluded without having the refugee status. Article 
33(2) presents criteria when the refugee is not entitled to the benefit of international 
protection which means that the refugee status can be revoked under 
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“The benefit […] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security […] or, who, having 
convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.” 
The problem is that Article 14(4) about ‘revocation, ending or refusal to renew refugee status’ 
of the Qualification Directive introduces criteria that Member States may decide to revoke a 
status (meaning that the asylum seeker has already the refugee status)  
“[w]hen: a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him … as a danger to the 
security […] b) he […] having been convicted by a final judgement of particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to […] Member State.”  
Further, Article 14(5) sets out that 
“In situations described in paragraph 4, Member States may decide not to grant status 
to a refugee where such decision has not yet been taken,” 
which means that the Qualification Directive bears a broader exclusion criterion – other than 
the Convention that actually broadens the exclusion criteria set out in Article 12(2) of the 
directive. It means that the refugee is deprived the status under EU law where he or she 
corresponds to criterion described in Article 14(4) of Qualification Directive and in the same 
time can be refused the status as an asylum seeker not as a refugee (refused without having 
the refugee status) under Article 14(5). A confusion from Article 14(5) may arise because in 
order to revoke the refugee status, it shall have to be granted in the first place.  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that Article 3 of the Qualifications Directive clearly 
permits Member States to introduce more favourable standards for qualification of a refugee 
status, but until those standards are consistent with the directive itself. Even though, the 
Article 14(4) is in line with the Convention, provision established in Article 14(5) is not 
included in Article 33 of the Convention. Therefore, taking into account Member State’s 
obligations towards international law, the additional criteria included in Article 14(5) of the 
Qualification Directive provides more restrictive standards on asylum seeker’s rights and 
clearly violates the Convention.  
With this in mind, EU legislative institutions had the opportunity to recast the Qualifications 
Directive, but it was not considered to be contingency even after a number of comments from 
UNCHR and ECRE.
91
 Therefore, it could be concluded, that it was legislator’s will to leave 
that provision unchanged. Even more, the recast of the Qualifications Directive bears even 
less commitment than the TFEU and concentrates on minimum standards.
92
 Additionally, as 
mentioned previously, the CJEU has the mandate to examine secondary EU law, but it can be 
observed that it stays reluctant in the context of asylum and national security to examine the 
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directive with the Convention. However, that could be a reason for leaving Member States to 
decide whether to follow their international commitment or not.
93
  
Nonetheless, the common asylum policy was intended to have uniform application, in reality 
CEAS manifests itself like a mixed agreement between EU and Member States.
94
 On the one 
hand, the Qualification Directive refers to the Convention where it clearly embeds the 
prohibition of expulsion and return.
95
 On the other hand, Member States bear certain 
discretionary power to decide on exclusion if it relates to national security and anti-
terrorism.
96
 
2.4. Interplay between EU and national law 
The development of common asylum policy currently is in tension between competence of 
EU and national sovereignty.
97
 In this subsection, the principle of solidarity and possible 
economic effects from taking refugees shall be analysed to comprehend the openness or 
closeness of Member States towards common asylum policy. Even more, analysis of 
approaches taken by states contribute to the research of how they exercise discretionary 
power under the shared competence of CEAS. 
The CEAS can be seen as a shared competence, nevertheless, the main goal was to ensure 
uniform application of it among all Member States.
98
 Even though Article 80 TFEU sets out 
“The policies of the Union […] shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States […]” 
number of Member States have opted not to follow this provision.
99
 For example, states that 
have chosen national sovereignty instead of duty to transpose obligations related to asylum 
(sharing of responsibility) field are Ireland, Denmark.
100
 However, it could be explained as a 
matter of inefficient management from the Union’s side that obviously Member States are 
reluctant to agree with the same strategy of refugee crisis.
101
 Additionally, it is important to 
note that the Qualifications Directive is in the process of its second recast which means that 
EU might be on its way to develop much stronger cohesion of the legal system in asylum 
field.
102
 
The aforementioned Article 80 TFEU embeds the principle of solidarity that specifically 
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relates to asylum, border control and migration. However, the principle itself lacks 
clarification within the Article 80 TFEU, for example, can it be invoked only in the case of 
emergency.
103
 Therefore, CEAS as a matter of common interest in combination with the 
principle of solidarity could mean different forms of burden-sharing instruments, for example, 
distribution of common funds.
104
 Nonetheless, the possible diverse choices by Member States 
might drive the CEAS counterproductive and even more drag it to failure.
105
 Consequently, a 
lack of coherence in relation to solidarity principle might bring the whole EU system 
disharmonic as states that are the first entry in EU (for example, Greece, Italy) have taken on 
inadequate responsibility and, therefore, are placed in struggling position financially and 
politically. 
It is obvious that the migration crisis has put EU in a very sudden situation, therefore, also the 
relationship between EU and its Member States is under tension. The shared competence 
leaves Member States with a certain discretionary power which means that actually it is 
voluntary for them to provide asylum, because the final decision to grant the refugee status is 
up for the national authority not CJEU. In other words, the event of 9/11 changed the 
application direction from that the exclusion clause preceded the inclusion clause for granting 
the status to refugee.
106
 It could be understood that before 9/11, the strategy of states were 
open towards granting refugee status not exclude the asylum seeker in the first place.  
Therefore, what shall mean ‘particularly serious crime’ under exclusion clause leave Member 
States with a broad interpretation under individual assesment when their national security is 
under question. Still, it is off utter importance for Member States to choose between humanity 
and reality as the later might end as a breach of the Convention.
107
  
Security and border control is one of the main issues within CEAS that decreases 
effectiveness of the principle of solidarity among Member States. The border control at 
national level and lack of harmonisation of the asylum policy influences also the EU external 
border control.
108
 In 2015 the European Commission proposed ‘The European Agenda on 
Migration’ that set out a plan how the EU could respond to migration crisis that included also 
scheme of EU budget division between Member States as the influx of refugees created 
disproportionate burden to Member States in the south.
109
 That scheme encompassed to 
cooperate European Asylum Support Office with Frontex, Eurojust and Europol to support 
Member States under pressure by helping to process asylum applications.
110
 Even thought it 
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was for the benefit for Member States, Austria, for example, announced that it will introduce 
cap on the total number of asylum seekers that it is willing to have in its territory.
111
 Even 
more, Denmark announced that it will not take part in resettlement of refugees.
112
 However, 
Germany declared that more unified asylum policy shall be released and processed 
applications regardless from where the asylum seeker entered EU.
113
 It means that the tension 
between sovereignty of Member States and EU competence related to migration has been 
under pressure for number of years. Nevertheless, it could be argued that approaches towards 
asylum policy from Member States might bear different political and economic goals that 
manifest themselves into discretion left for Member States under shared competence.  
Subsequently, one could argue that the upcoming strategy of Germany, for example, might be 
explained as that there are uncertainties about demographic growth of Germans in the 
future.
114
 Therefore, the decision about taking refugees above resettlement quotas might be 
based on long-term thinking about population projections in the future. Furthermore, another 
benefit that could raise from taking refugees is an increase in Gross Domestic Product. 
However, it has been also argued that a failure to improve integration measures and 
qualification structure in the long term, could lead to negative economic consequences in the 
future.
115
  
Following the aforementioned analysis, it could be concluded that the discretionary power left 
for Member States manifests itself into choice between principle of solidarity and national 
interest related to public security. Even thought, EU struggles to implement coherent common 
asylum policy, there still are states that choose to opt-out as Denmark. Furthermore, 
Germany, for instance, choose to come forward with approach intended for economic growth 
as ‘sacrifice for benefit’ to compensate demographic decrease in the future. While the 
interaction between EU and national level seem to introduce approaches of Member States, 
trends of CJEU in cases related to terrorism, Member State’s security in the context of asylum 
will be analysed in the third part. 
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3. LEGAL TRENDS OF CJEU 
The CJEU uses number of trends when it deals with the complicated round scheme of 
national, EU and international law relationship where a specific typology of cases (group of 
cases) can be distinguished that relates to terrorism and security of the Member State in the 
context of asylum. The reasoning of CJEU related to the Qualification Directive, the 
Convention and national law will be discussed in the following sub-sections to uncover the 
legal trends of CJEU how and in what situations it applies and interprets the Convention and 
what discretionary power it leaves for Member States. 
Trends can be divided on how the CJEU uses the principle of proportionality. For example, 
the CJEU uses mere references, considerations of international law, but leaves the assessment 
of facts for the national courts. One could conclude that, CJEU can be seen as a regional 
refugee jurisprudence developer with a commitment to international arena. Therefore, the 
embeddedness of the Convention into secondary and primary EU law brings into attention 
CJEU’s approaches towards international and national level. It could be argued that CJEU 
acts like a safeguard of its own success (developed authority)
116
 by limiting itself to provide 
answers for preliminary ruling references. In other words, it does not step over its 
competences and does not intervene with national security affairs.
117
  
3.1. Consideration of international law 
One of the trends observed is a consideration of the international legal instrument where the 
CJEU acknowledges the Convention but refuses to apply it by pointing to its competences. In 
the Qurbani, the CJEU particularly pointed out its mandate limitation.
118
 This case is 
important because the refugee is a third country national whose criminal activities have got 
under the consideration of the Convention, national criminal law and the Qualification 
Directive that are used as a basis for refusal of refugee status. The German Court of second 
instance had doubts about the interpretation of Article 31 that was brought up in the criminal 
proceeding against Mr Qurbani for the use of service of people smugglers, illegal entry, 
unauthorized stay and presentation of forged passport.
119
 It should be added that Mr Qurbani 
did not enter the Member State directly from the state of persecution which means that he 
passed by several Member States and under national law could be punished for criminal 
activities.  
One of the mere issues was, that the question asked did not contain any EU rule that makes 
renvoi to Article 31.
120
 In particular, even though, the Article 14(6) of the Directive (that is 
relevant in the main proceedings) makes renvoi to the Article 31 of the Convention, the 
request did not include exactly that EU provision.
121
 Moreover, the CJEU stated that, 
although, it has previously held in B and D
122
 (will be discussed further) that there shall be 
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uniform interpretation of provisions from international agreements that have been taken over 
by Member States and EU, the Article 31 has not been taken over by EU law even if there is a 
number of references to Article 31 from EU legislation. Finally, the CJEU points to lack of 
jurisdiction that could be regarded as the main argument in the case. 
Firstly, it refers to Article 267 of TFEU where it clearly notes that it cannot directly interpret 
Article 31 of the Convention. Even more, the Convention itself does not contain a clause 
about CJEU’s jurisdiction. Second, it brings up a point where it states that it has no 
jurisdiction to interpret international agreements concluded between Member States and non-
member countries and where the Union itself is not a party. Subsequently, for no surprise, the 
CJEU shows that it does not want to be considered as an international refugee court and it will 
not step over its mandate by directly interpreting international treaty provisions. Thirdly, it 
reminds that in the field of CEAS, Member States hold certain part of competence, that in this 
case relate to the Article 31 of the Convention even taking into account the fact that it is also a 
part of EU law.
123
  
Therefore, it could be concluded, that CJEU is very strict on its mandate to interpret 
provisions from international agreements, except where they copy-paste the same wording in 
the EU legislation. Even if there is an explicit reference included in the preamble of the 
Qualification Directive, actually corresponding to the whole setting of the legal act, the CJEU 
argues that it does not count as a renvoi.
124
 Moreover, this approach manifests itself into 
showing that CJEU might not want to admit Convention as a part of EU law. Furthermore, the 
reasoning of the CJEU also might mean that it tries to manoeuvre from possible interaction 
with international law in meantime declaring its importance and actual references in EU 
legislation. 
 
It also redirects the jurisdiction to interpret the international law to the court of the Member 
State taking into account the fact that - yes, there are certain power that EU has taken over 
previously exercised by Member States, but not Article 31 of the Convention, as the CEAS is 
shared competence. Obviously, states cannot deny their legal responsibility, but what is even 
less clear is when the responsibility of EU starts and jurisdiction of CEJU applies if the court 
has full jurisdiction in the field of immigration and asylum after the Lisbon Treaty
125
. It has 
raised confusion about the effect from international law in EU legislation, whether, if the 
German Court would have asked the question including reference to Article 14(6) of the 
Qualification Directive, would still the CJEU refuse to interpret the Convention.
126
 However, 
it can be observed that in this case the approach of CJEU depended on the content of the 
preliminary question. 
3.2. Consistent interpretation of international law 
Another trend exercised by CJEU is consistent interpretation of international law which is 
mainly used in cases relating to asylum and terrorism. A background summary has to be 
provided to better comprehend this approach.  
In the opinion of Ziegler, the CJEU has three approaches how it relies on international law. 
                                                     
123
 Judgement in Qurbani, C‑481/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101, paragraphs 19-25.  
124
 Supra 42.  
125
 Supra 17, p.220. Gabor Gyulai, “The Luxemburg Court: Conductor for a Disharmonious Orchestra?” 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2012): p. 10. 
126
 Supra 47, p.50. 
 26 
First, it gives direct effect as mentioned in previous part.
127
 To recall, it means that the court 
approves and protects the right involved and acknowledges its crucial influence when 
applying the rule.
128
 Second, CJEU emphasizes the importance and application of 
international law when interpreting EU law, which is called consistent interpretation. Third, it 
uses “substantive borrowing” when there is a need to fill gaps in EU law or, for example, 
facilitate coherence from EU law towards international law. Aforementioned three instances 
are approaches used by CJEU encompassing how it relies on international law.
129
 In cases 
discussed further, the trend undertaken by the CJEU could be defined as consistent 
interpretation as CJEU gives no direct effect to the Convention even there are explicit 
references included in Qualifications Directive, but interprets the secondary EU law as far as 
possible in the line with the international law.
130
 
The Convention has been hardly put into attention in judgements ruled by CJEU. The rulings 
include short references to the Convention and articles from it are interpreted if they duplicate 
the provision in EU law. B and D
131
 and Lounani
132
 cases will be analysed where the CJEU 
clarifies provisions from the Qualification Directive in the line with the Convention. The 
central question in both cases was whether a membership of a terroristic organization fulfils 
criteria under Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of Qualification Directive that states 
“A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being a refugee, where 
there are serious reasons for considering that … b) he or she has committed a serious 
non-political crime outside the country of refuge … particularly cruel actions, even if 
committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-
political crimes; c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Charter of the United Nations,” 
 to exclude the person from refugee status. The aforementioned articles mirror the Article 1F 
of the Convention and even add additional wording, however, Article 1F states that  
“The provisions … shall not apply to any person … to whom there are serious reasons 
for considering that: … b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge prior to his admission … c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.”133  
In addition, B and D is the first case where connection with terroristic activities was the basis 
for exclusion from refugee status.
134
 Lounani could be considered as a development of 
jurisprudence of B and D as it expands the application of exclusion clause.
135
 
In B and D, German authority had rejected both applications because applicants had done 
non-political serious crimes in the past and in addition D was guilty of acts contrary to the 
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purposes and principles of UN.
136
 Even more, both were also included in the list of persons 
annexed to the Common Position [2001/931] who had employed terroristic methods
137
. 
However, it was not clear whether terroristic activity would assume as non-political serious 
crime or act contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN and whether acts done by 
applicants would fulfil exclusion criteria under national law and Qualification Directive.  
First, CJEU pointed out that it has a jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling because grounds 
for exclusion in Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive in substance corresponded to 
those laid down in Article 1F of the Convention.
138
 Second, it referred to the preamble of the 
Qualification Directive and noted that provisions of it shall be interpreted consistent with the 
Convention and the Charter.
139
 Hence, while in this case the CJEU stated that the whole 
directive shall be interpreted in the light with the Convention, in aforementioned Qurbani 
case it did not even reflect on the treaty.
140
 Moreover, CJEU does not bring itself into 
analysing differences into wording provided in the Qualification Directive and the 
Convention, which actually might raise problematics towards international law.
141
 
Additionally, in contrast to the reasoning of CJEU, Advocate General Mengozzi engages with 
detailed considerations of the Convention, UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on 
International Protection to base his statements of the interpretation of Qualifications Directive 
on the Convention.
142
  
Third, it pointed out that terroristic acts count as non-political crimes and in general are 
contrary to the purposes and principles of UN. Nevertheless, it noted that the fact that the 
person has been related to terroristic activities does not automatically exclude him from 
refugee status.
143
 In other words, even though persons have been listed in Common Position 
[2001/931], there is no direct link between Common Position [2001/931] and Qualifications 
Directive, therefore, the exclusion decision cannot be based only on individual associated 
with a membership of terroristic group.  Even more, CJEU also pointed out, that it also does 
not directly constitute the person as a threat to the security of the present Member State where 
the application has been submitted.
144
  
Hence, as reasoned by the CJEU, it should be stressed out that fundamental right to effective 
legal remedy and right to asylum have been put forward than national security issues. 
However, CJEU has left it unclear what constitutes terroristic act. The reasoning is rather 
provided with vague statement that terroristic act is a violence against civilian population that 
does not present a definite answer.
145
 Furthermore, CJEU stated that it is necessary to have an 
individual assessment of the facts.
146
 Therefore, indeed, the reasoning of CJEU shows that it 
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uses the principle of proportionality which manifests itself, meaning that, CJEU provides 
guidance for the interpretation of the norm, but the assessment of facts is left for the national 
authority by carrying out individual interview.
147
 Yet, pointed out by Advocate General 
Mengozzi, the CJEU was not asked to rule on facts of the case.
148
 
Similarly, in Lounani CJEU pointed out that provisions of Qualification Directive shall be 
interpreted in the light of the Convention which means that CJEU approached the Convention 
with consistent interpretation.
149
 The core question in this case was what activities define 
terrorist under Article 12 of Qualification Directive. In other words, should any ancillary 
activities related to participation in terroristic organization be sufficient for exclusion under 
Article 12.
150
  
Before applying for refugee status Mr Lounani, a Moroccan national, was sentenced in 
Belgium for providing logistical support to a terrorist group for supplying information, 
engaging in forgery, participating actively in recruitment of network for sending volunteers to 
Iraq. After imprisonment Mr Lounani applied for refugee status because he feared persecution 
of being returned to Morocco after his conviction. However, national authorities excluded him 
from the refugee status on the basis of Article 12(2)(c).
151
 It was not clear whether any kind of 
participation in terroristic actions also can be considered as acts contrary to the principles and 
values of UN defined under Article 1 of the Framework Decision 2002/475 combating 
terrorism.
152
  
Subsequently, the decision was appealed by arguing that he cannot be excluded from the 
refugee status as his previous activities did not constitute terrorist offences as such and did not 
reach the degree of seriousness that would count as activities contrary to the purposes and 
principles of UN.
153
 Nevertheless, it should be noted, that at the time when Mr Lounani was 
convicted, the ruling was based on Article 2 of Framework Decision 2002/475 combating 
terrorism that defines offences relating to terrorist groups and includes acts of participation.
154
 
Therefore, the national criminal court did not base its finding on personal involvement in 
terroristic activities.
155
 Again, a disputable question arose whether indirect terroristic acts 
could be considered as grounds for exclusion from refugee status.
156
 
Advocate General Sharpston presented a very clear reasoning about the application of 
exclusion clause of Article 12(2)(c) by arguing that it should not be limited to acts included in 
the Article 1 of Framework Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism.
157
 First, in her 
opinion, it was pointed out that wording in Article 12(2)(c) of the Qualifications Directive is 
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not defined by reference to the Framework Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism. In 
other words, the exclusion clause cannot be limited to terroristic crimes.
158
 Second, it was 
suggested that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the Convention because the 
application of Article 1F(c) is not conditional with any findings at national or international 
level concerning terrorist offences.
159
 Third, Qualifications Directive and Framework 
Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism present different areas of law, therefore, have 
different purposes and cannot have the same starting points for interpretation of rules from 
Qualifications Directive.
160
 Fourth, the application of Article 1 of the Framework Decision 
2002/475 on combating terrorism would introduce new prerequisite for exclusion, meaning, 
that there should be a prior criminal conviction for terroristic crime. To put the same way, that 
approach would narrow the exclusion clause.
161
 Fifth, Advocate General noted that the 
Framework Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism is an instrument of variable geometry 
– Member States can decide not to be bound by it which would lead to inconsistency when 
applying Qualifications Directive.
162
 Therefore, it was emphasized that the conviction of 
terroristic offence is not conditional to be excluded from refugee status.
163
 In other words, any 
ancillary activities related to participation in a terroristic organization result as grounds for 
exclusion from refugee status. 
Furthermore, it was suggested by the Advocate General that even though the criminal 
conviction of terroristic offences is relevant for exclusion, there shall be exercised individual 
assessment. First, the fact that it is a terroristic organization shall be determined.
164
 Second, 
the nature of Mr Lounani’s membership in particular organization have to be assessed (his 
role, position, motives, intentions). Finally, it is concluded that even if the applicant or the 
organization had not committed cruel act of terrorism referred in Article 1 of the Framework 
Decision 2002/475 on combating terrorism, the asylum seeker can still be excluded from the 
refugee status.
165
  
Likewise in B and D, first, CJEU admitted that the Qualifications Directive has to be 
interpreted in a consistent manner with the Convention.
166
 Further, generally the reasoning of 
CJEU does not differ much from the opinion of Advocate General. It comes as no surprise 
that the CJEU also emphasizes that Article 12(2)(c) (that is a reflection of Article 1F of the 
Convention) cannot be interpreted by attributing it to terrorist offences only.
167
 With this in 
mind, CJEU analyses the recital 22 of the Qualifications Directive and points out that acts 
contrary to purposes and principles of UN are set out in particular UNSC resolutions where it 
is stated that “knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the 
purposes and principles of UN”.168 To add, in another UNSC resolution all signatory parties 
to the Charter of UN are called to deny safe place for persons who support terroristic 
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activities.
169
 Therefore, acts contrary to the purposes and principles of UN cannot be limited 
to listed activities in Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision 2002/475 on combating 
terrorism.
170
 Even more, CJEU also notes that if the EU legislature would have had an intent 
limit the scope of the Article 12(2)(c) of the Qualifications Directive, there would have been a 
reference to the Framework Decision 2002/475.
171
  
Second, it followed that participation in terroristic activities as forgery of documents, assisting 
volunteers to travel to Iraq fell under exclusion scope even it did not constitute a direct 
terroristic crime committed by Mr Lounani. Aforementioned activities were serious enough 
and identified acts that shall be combated by States to avoid international terrorism and 
therefore, justified exclusion from refugee status.
172
 Third, above all, CJEU recalled its 
judgement in B and D and declared that individual assessment should be undertaken which is 
left for the national court.
173
 Deference left for national authorities will be discussed in the 
next section. 
To sum up, there are two main takeaways from the CJEU judgement in Lounani case. First, 
the individual is excluded from the refugee status because terrorism and asylum together 
contradict what is globally acceptable for society. Second, the exclusion scope has been 
broadened from direct terroristic acts done in B and D to activities related to terrorism in 
Lounani case. 
Despite that CJEU and Advocate General Sharpston emphasized the distinction between 
counter-terrorism and asylum law (no textual link, different purposes of law, different origins 
and nature), in practice those two fields are close and merge together. First, the CJEU 
admitted that there is a reference in the Qualifications Directive to the Convention and UNSC 
resolutions.
174
 Moreover, there is a legal commitment to the society that States will combat 
terrorism.
175
 Second, CJEU cleared out that there is a direct link in the wording between 
Article 12(2)(c) and Article 1F which meant that CJEU can interpret the norm directly and 
thus the individual can be excluded from the refugee status.
176
  
Overall, still, it can be observed, that CJEU is ruling as constitutional and administrative 
body. From one side, as a preventive administrative mechanism it provides interpretation in B 
and D whether serious non-political crime falls within the category of terroristic activities. 
From other side, it analysis carefully fundamental rights of the individual.
177
 Furthermore, in 
Lounani CJEU puts forward that any ancillary activities that support terroristic actions can be 
regarded as activities exercised against purposes and principles of UN. But at the same time 
notes that a fact of criminal conviction cannot be a prerequisite for exclusion in the context of 
asylum, in particular, when the content of the international protection is interpreted. However, 
as also noted by Bank, CJEU interprets the Article of international treaty only if it is duplicate 
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of EU norm.
178
  
Reasoning in Lounani could be regarded as continuation of the judgment in B and D as CJEU 
emphasizes the importance of the Convention and interprets the secondary EU law as far as 
possible in the line with the international treaty. It even notes in both cases that individual 
assessment of facts is necessary and that the exclusion clause cannot be automatically applied 
that again approves the constitutional role of the court and also that it strives to balance 
between application of EU law and fundamental rights.
179
 Furthermore, following Bank’s 
reasoning that the CJEU actually refers to the Convention and continuously recognizes the 
yardstick function provided in Article 78 TFEU in cases related to exclusion, cessation or a 
refugee status revocation, it could be added that it more likely admits the importance of the 
Convention when interpreting EU law and uses the international instrument for gap filling 
rather gives it direct effect.
180
 It comes as no surprise that while the CJEU will exercise its 
trends by moving away from international law, it might influence the possibility of lack of 
coherence and increase the threshold of conflicts, that should be avoided.
181
 Hence, Member 
States are left facing their international obligations where the final word belongs to national 
authorities.  
3.3. Margin of appreciation left for national authorities 
Although the concept of margin of appreciation has been developed by ECtHR, a similar 
approach has been undertaken by CJEU.
182
 This trend can be observed in cases where CJEU 
has left national authorities to deal with their international obligations - the individual 
assessment of facts that impacts the final decision of the case.
183
 Margin of appreciation can 
be regarded as a discretion left for Member States with due respect to their cultural 
differences, resources and values.
184
 As discussed in previous section, in Qurbani CJEU noted 
that certain powers are left for Member States in CEAS.
185
 Even more, it has been argued that 
margin of appreciation is invoked when there is a possibility of broad interpretation of a 
vague term or when the scope is so narrow where the legislator has not predicted such 
norm.
186
 
Terrorism is not specifically defined in the Qualification Directive which means that rather 
Member States are left to determine their own interpretation.
187
 In B and D, the CJEU referred 
to UNSC resolutions of ‘international  terrorism’ that must be combatted to maintain 
international peace and security that might be a way how it defined terrorism and acts 
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regarded contrary to the principles and purposes of UN.
188
 However, one should also 
determine the gravity of the terroristic act concerned that it might impact the international 
security.
189
 Therefore, definition of terrorism determined at national scope shall be at stake in 
order to exclude or refuse the refugee status.  
Therefore, taking into account cases discussed above in the context of asylum Member States 
have a discretion to rule on internal matters where they face danger to public security. There 
can be two discretionary approaches observed that determine public security, one that relates 
to individual assessment of facts and the other that determines the seriousness of the crime 
and current danger. For example, about inclusion of asylum seeker who has been engaged in 
terroristic activities in the past individual assessment of facts shall be taken.  
3.3.1. Individual assessment 
In both B and D and Lounani, CJEU pointed out that engagement with terroristic acts and 
related activities do not automatically exclude the person from refugee status. It was noted 
that there shall be individual assessment, full investigation in all circumstances, determination 
of the extent to which there was a participation in terroristic activities, the role of 
leadership.
190
 Meaning that interpretation of facts is left for national courts.  
Furthermore, CJEU acted similarly in H.T. case where it also left discretion for national body. 
In this case German authorities revoked refugee status and residence permit on the basis of 
the fact that the applicant had in past supported goals of a terrorist organization.
191
 It was left 
for the national court to rule on the person’s involvement, role exercised in the terrorist 
group.
192
 Therefore, CJEU exercises its power within certain limits that does not go beyond 
decisions of assessment of individual circumstances. It might be one of the court’s strategies 
to draw a line between Qualifications Directive and Convention. In other words, the CJEU 
provides guidance to the extent until it can provide uniform interpretation. 
Moreover, one could conclude that CJEU by emphasizing the fundamental right to asylum 
and encouraging national authorities to take all individual circumstances into account, 
prevents the individual from challenging other EU norm, for instance, right to effective legal 
remedy under Article 47 of the Charter.
193
 However, discretion left for national authorities 
does not ensure uniform application of EU norms as there are different practices and 
standards in national judicial procedures.
194
 Even more, it might mean that the norm is unclear 
and weak as CJEU cannot determine exact guidance.  
3.3.2. Danger to public security 
The approach of discretion between fundamental rights and security of the country of 
receiving asylum seekers for international protection has been put forward by CJEU. It is a 
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possibility for refusal the refugee status if he poses threat to the Member State. This approach 
taken by national authorities is closely linked to public power and therefore represents the 
Member State’s openness towards the right to international protection of asylum seeker or 
rather closeness due to public security.
195
  
The extent of danger that the refugee might pose to the Member State was reasoned in B and 
D. There were two tips to take away from the reasoning of CJEU. First, a current danger to 
the public security cannot be conditional for application of exclusion clause of Qualifications 
Directive.
196
 Even more, in this matter it would not be appropriate to apply exclusion clause 
of Article 12(2), but to revoke refugee status under Article 14(4)(a) of the Qualification 
Directive that sets out that Member States may revoke refugee status where, in particular, 
there are reasonable grounds for considering the individual as posing danger to security.
197
  
Second, the national authority cannot take additional proportionality test to measure the 
seriousness of the acts committed if it has already taken into account individual’s 
responsibility and all related circumstances.
198
 If the proportionality assessment would be 
taken it would mean that the exclusion clause is with dual objective.
199
 However, one could 
argue that the individual was entitled also to proportionality assessment and, therefore, to due 
process as it was about examining individual responsibility. Furthermore, the rejection of 
proportionality test did not provide the national authority to grant the refugee status in the first 
place.
200
 It should be also emphasized that, actually, the margin of appreciation left for 
national body provides the authority with wider competence because the final decision is left 
for the Member State that depends on how it approaches the matter of prevention of terrorism 
and exercises the individual assessment of the facts.  
It can be concluded, that CJEU limits itself to the extent that does not reach sensitive issues 
like public security and fundamental rights for protection of an individual. It leaves national 
authorities to decide on case by case basis to weight on matters that relate to seriousness of 
the offence where the individual could be considered posing danger to public security of 
Member State. At the same time, CJEU acts like a supranational court and provides 
interpretation and application of a norm from the Convention. However, it provides this 
guidance only where the EU law duplicates the norm from the Convention. Overall, in B and 
D, Lounani and H.T the CJEU took similar reasoning where it clearly noted that the 
individual cannot be deprived from the right to international protection without taking 
individual assessment.
201
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to examine what are the Court’s approaches when applying 
the Qualification Directive. As the CJEU is the final judicial body that can provide guidance 
about uniform application of EU law, it is set in a complex context in the field of asylum 
where rather ambiguously formulated Treaty provisions interact with the Charter and the 
Convention. 
The research shows that the Court has clearly defined its limits by acknowledging its 
competences. It does not have the mandate to interpret provisions from the Convention, 
however, it can do it where the EU norm includes the same wording. Moreover, it has a 
jurisdiction to review the validity of secondary EU law in the light of the international law if 
the EU is a party to the international treaty. Overall, it has been founded that the Court 
struggles between its constitutionalist and administrative role by balancing between effective 
application of EU law and enforcement of fundamental rights. Meanwhile, it is important for 
the CJEU to provide rulings that examine EU law comprehensively by covering all levels of 
legal orders with what EU law could interact. However, the Court seems reluctant towards 
Convention as provisions of it could be considered of broad logic and undefined.  
The analysis has shown that the CJEU has three trends how it exercises its mandate when 
applying Qualification Directive. The overall approach manifests into principle of 
proportionality where the Court engages with the international law as far as it concerns 
uniform application of EU law, but the individual assessment and interpretation of the facts of 
the case leaves for the national authorities. First, it is found that the CJEU considers 
international law as a source, but manoeuvres from possible interaction with it by invoking 
the shared responsibility between Member States and the Union. Second, the Court uses 
consistent interpretation where it interprets EU law as far as possible in the line with the 
Convention. Third, it leaves the final decision for the national courts that concerns the 
individual assessment and public interest due to danger to security.  
The margin of appreciation left for states rather engages with application of human rights and 
responsibility towards international commitments. However, the value of sovereignty stays 
crucial where tension raises between it and fundamental rights of the asylum seeker. As the 
CEAS is a shared competence the discretion left for Member States discloses into different 
political and economic goals that might undermine the principle of solidarity and even more a 
coherent application of the common asylum policy.  
Throughout this thesis it has sought to be demonstrated that the CJEU is put in a difficult 
position to stand up as an administrative and constitutional court. There is a need to amend 
EU treaty provisions (TFEU) and the Qualification Directive to overcome the existing 
collision between EU law and the Convention. It has been also emphasized that CJEU cannot 
provide guidance by isolating EU law from other legal orders. It is important for the Court to 
keep the right balance between all international actors as its rulings contribute to national 
jurisprudence. The challenge would rather be to keep this balance in long term. Thought, if 
the Court has been set up as a court of EU it should stay within its limits.  
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